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Adult and continuing education are under pressure from the right. While discrimination and restrictive integration policies are widely discussed, the specific role of far-right pressure is often not explicitly addressed. This article, therefore, examines how far-right influences affect language provision for migrants through a scoping review of the existing literature. Based on ten included publications, the findings show that far-right pressure reshapes both policy frameworks and public discourse around language provision, with mainstream parties increasingly adopting far-right positions. Language provision is redefined from a social right to an instrument of control, embedded in narratives of cultural threat and national unity that promote monolingualism and assimilation, reinforced by neoliberal logics that affect funding, implementation, and participation. The review further identifies significant gaps in the literature regarding far-right influence on language provision and counterstrategies.

Schlagworte: adult education; language provision; right-wing populism; far right

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Far-right Pressure on Adult Education and Language Provision for Adult Refugees and Migrants

RACHEL CHARLOTT MAYR & ANKE GROTLÜSCHEN

Abstract: Adult and continuing education are under pressure from the right. While discrimination and restrictive integration policies are widely discussed, the specific role of far-right pressure is often not explicitly addressed. This article, therefore, examines how far-right influences affect language provision for migrants through a scoping review of the existing literature. Based on ten included publications, the findings show that far-right pressure reshapes both policy frameworks and public discourse around language provision, with mainstream parties increasingly adopting far-right positions. Language provision is redefined from a social right to an instrument of control, embedded in narratives of cultural threat and national unity that promote monolingualism and assimilation, reinforced by neoliberal logics that affect funding, implementation, and participation. The review further identifies significant gaps in the literature regarding far-right influence on language provision and counterstrategies.

Keywords: adult education; language provision; right-wing populism; far right

1 Introduction

In recent years, politics in many European countries has shifted noticeably to the right. Right-wing populist and extremist right actors increasingly seek to influence integration policies as well as state and civil society institutions, including adult education providers (Giudici et al., 2025; Hussain & Yunus, 2021). There is evidence that Radical Right-wing Populist Parties (RRPP) in governments use their bargaining power to demand restrictive policy reforms in the area of immigrant integration rather than migration policy (Lutz, 2019, p. 535). This occurs within a broader EU context in which policies have become increasingly conditional and security-oriented (Tutar et al., 2026). First findings on adult education and far-right pressure show that institutions supporting vulnerable groups in literacy and basic education are particularly affected (Buddeberg et al., 2025). Language and literacy programs for young and adult refugees and migrants operate at the intersection of migration, language, and belonging, making them a focus of far-right politics (Buddeberg et al., 2025). There is highly relevant research on integration courses (e.g., Dollhausen, 2006; Kloubert & Dickerhoff 2020; Heinemann, 2014, 2018; Käßpinger, 2017, 2020), but it focuses on discrimination and

marginalization as such, not on the strategies and influence of the far right. This article, therefore, contributes to research on migration-related language provision and emerging debates on the influence of the far right and aims to provide a better starting point for future analyses of right-wing influences on adult education. This is important for developing counterstrategies and for protecting the adult education landscape.

The article is developed from earlier German research and is a follow-up study of the project *Brandmauern im Bildungswesen*. It starts from the finding that far-right parties have attacked language provision since 2018, especially with parliamentary questions (*Kleine Anfragen*) (Buddeberg et al., 2025). The paper offers a theoretical framework to understand the terminology and then presents a literature overview on the effects of right-wing policies on adult education. This identifies the research gap as a lack of knowledge on far-right pressure against migrant language provision. Therefore, the key analysis of this article is an international scoping review to examine what is known from existing literature about far-right influences on migrant language provision.

The findings demonstrate how far-right pressure reshapes policies and discourse around language provision. Language learning is reframed from a social right into a sanction-based obligation, embedded in nativist narratives of cultural threat and national cohesion that prioritize assimilation over integration. Research on the concrete effects of far-right pressure on language teachers and learners remains limited.

2 Conceptual frameworks

Various approaches are used to conceptualize right-wing populism and extremism. We refer to two of these approaches. Populism is understood as ‘a thin-centered ideology’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6), which divides society into a homogeneous *people* and a corrupt elite, and views politics as the expression of the people’s general will. Following Mudde, this is the first feature of right-wing populism. Nativism, the second and central feature of *right-wing* populism (Mudde, 2007, p. 16), holds that the state should belong exclusively to the native population, viewing non-native people and ideas as threats to national homogeneity (ibid., p. 19). Authoritarianism, the third feature of right-wing populism, is defined by Mudde (2007, p. 23) as ‘the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely’. However, the term right-wing populism is not uncontroversial, given the complex and dynamic interplay of völkisch-nationalist, neoliberal, far-right, and national-conservative networks and actors within the AfD (Virchow, 2016, p. 30). According to Jaschke, in addition to the features mentioned by Mudde – such as nativism and authoritarianism – right-wing extremism seeks to reverse democratization and encompasses a totality of attitudes, behaviors, and actions – whether organized or not (Jaschke, 1994, p. 30). Following Jaschke’s definition of right-wing extremism, research in Germany has shown that right-wing extremist attitudes are not confined to specific parties; they can also be found among people in the center (Zick et al., 2025). The term far-right serves as an

umbrella category encompassing both right-wing populism and extremism (Pirro, 2023). Where it is unclear whether a movement, party, or discourse can be classified as far-right, this article uses the broader term *right-wing* to identify pressure on adult education.

The term language provision is used to refer to all language and literacy programs for adult refugees and migrants. Typical for language provision for migrants is the combination of language courses and civic orientation classes. Language provision for migrants and refugees is part of the integration policy. Integration policies are defined as ‘policies that support and regulate civic and cultural integration’ (Akkerman, 2012, p. 517). Migration policies, on the other hand, regulate who and how many people are allowed to come to a country.

3 Adult education and language provision under far-right pressure

The body of literature is thin, but we can claim that several aspects of adult and continuing education are under pressure. Far-right parties have always been problematic for liberal, political, or civic adult education (Nuissl & Popović, 2020). But these days, adult education as a whole is under pressure, partly with violent methods (Buddeberg et al., 2025). In their election campaign in 2025, the German Christian Democrats questioned a large range of civil society organizations, accusing them of not being *neutral* (Grotlüschen et al., 2026). The term *neutrality* is constantly used to delegitimize democratic civil society organizations and all areas of education (Sämann, 2021; Wischmann, 2023). Moreover, since the first Trump election and Brexit, both in 2016, the pressure from the right not only affects civic education, but it pushes against adult education as a whole, with pressure strategies on macro, meso-, and micro levels of adult education (Grotlüschen et al., 2026).

In a Western European study (Berg et al., 2023), a group of researchers analyzed right-wing populist party programs in fourteen countries. They find that education is not (yet) a key theme for them. However, right-wing parties try to influence curricula, remove international openness, language programs, and insert national literature. This is confirmed by a Danish study on two populist party programs. The data show that populist education does not serve critical thinking but obeys the authority (Rasmussen, 2025).

Regarding adult education in companies, by trade unions and around employability, we find that trade unions and their educational activities face pseudo-trade unions and right-wing workers’ board members (Schroeder et al., 2019; Schroeder et al., 2024).

Moreover, we find that the U. S. American movement against diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) is mirrored in continuing education (Hyrnsalmi et al., 2025). Recent research on the releases of companies’ strategy papers shows that stock market companies’ reactions range from destroying DEI initiatives to submarine strategies as well as strengthening DEI – it all depends on their stakeholders and customers (Evans & Nochebuena-Evans, 2025). However, companies with more diverse and open-minded cus-

tomers financially benefit from sticking to their DEI strategies (Hyrynsalmi et al., 2025). The populist idea of *nativism* is the key pressure that continuing and further education face.

Our own earlier study showed that literacy and language provision are under pressure as serving the *weak* and the *immigrants*. Both are populations that are considered less valuable than the dominant (so-called *native*) populations. Far-right parties are trying to delegitimize language provision by parliamentary inquiries (*Anfragen*). Findings show that this started early (2019) and is repeated across provinces (Grotlüschen et al., 2026). The lengthy, empirically saturated responses from the government show how difficult it is to justify language provision for recent migrants. So far, all far-right questions that aimed at attacking language provision for adults have been rejected by democratic majorities in the parliaments (ibid.).

Our own findings reported here build on data collected at the end of 2024, in a non-representative, qualitative collection of cases. In the meantime, the German government changed, and language provision for migrants faced cutbacks¹. Earlier research on elections within political parties already shows that leftist parties advocate more for adult education than the conservative, (neo)liberal, or right-wing populist parties in Germany (Käpplinger, 2025).

Adult education research confirms that the large shares of integration courses became an important task for the providers (Käpplinger, 2017, 2020), while criticism addresses the linear model of integration (Heinemann, 2014, 2018) as well as their hegemonic function (Dollhausen, 2006), especially regarding the orientation courses (Kloubert & Dickerhof, 2020). This is in line with a long-term discourse on discrimination against migrants (Sprung, 2011, 2021). However, we seldom find a clear notion of right-wing populist policies or pressures as the reason for increasing discrimination or restrictive integration policies. It therefore seems necessary to have a closer look at far-right influences on migrant language provision. As there is little research in Germany and the far-right movement is an international phenomenon, a scoping review is employed. The following question guides the review: *What is known from the existing literature about far-right influences on migrant language provision?*

4 Scoping literature review

Following on from the conceptual frameworks of far-right pressure and language provision as outlined above, this scoping review aims to identify and map literature that attributes barriers and challenges in language provision to right-wing populist and far-right influences. Building on prior research on far-right pressure in adult education, the review extends the focus to all levels of language provision for adult migrants and refugees. The following section describes the methodological approach and its implementation.

1 <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2024/11/kabinett-integrationskurse.html>

4.1 Methodological approach

Scoping reviews are done for the purpose of determining ‘the scope or coverage of a body of literature on a given topic and give a clear indication of the volume of literature and studies available as well as an overview (broad or detailed) of its focus’ (Munn et al., 2018, p. 2). Following Arksey’s and O’Malley’s (2005, pp. 21–22) reasoning to conduct a scoping review, the goal of this review is to identify research gaps in the existing literature.

The framework for conducting the review was based on the phases proposed by Arksey and Malley, including identifying the research question, identifying relevant studies, selecting studies, charting the data, and collating, synthesizing, and reporting the results (ibid, p. 22).

4.2 Identifying relevant studies

Between October and November 2025, a scoping literature search was conducted using a sensitive search strategy to capture terminological variation in language provision and integration research (Nordhausen & Hirt, 2018). Based on an initial review of national language provision programs and policy documents, relevant terms related to language provision and right-wing populism were identified. The search strategy combined two search strands (app. 1): one addressing language provision and integration, and the other addressing right-wing populism and the far right. To ensure analytical clarity, only studies explicitly labeling political influence as right-wing or far-right were included. Search strings were adapted to database-specific requirements and applied in three databases commonly used in adult education research: FIS Bildung, ERIC, and Web of Science. Database searches were supplemented by citation tracking and manual searches of key journals and publishers. The iterative search yielded 409 records (FIS Bildung: 0; ERIC: 18 language/277 integration; Web of Science: 7 language/42 integration; Springer manual search: 49; hand search: 19).

4.3 Study selection and charting the data

The results were included or excluded by the criteria which we defined before (app. 2). Inclusion criteria were: 1) The subject area of adult education is addressed, this refers to language provision; 2) The terms of content, the focus is on language provision; 3) The text is published in English or German; 4) Up to the point of full text analysis, collective works will be included as soon as one of the contributions meets the above criteria; 5) Topic is addressed in the main/full text, not just in the appendix; 6) We limited the review to literature from EU member states and the UK, as these countries share broadly comparable institutional frameworks for language provision, as well as similar political dynamics related to right-wing populism; 7) We also only included articles based on empirical research.

After excluding records with linguistic or thematic incompatibility, 67 titles remained. We did not limit the publication period, as the scope of the literature was already quite limited. Based on abstract and full-text screening, the publications were categorized according to their relevance to the research focus. Three groups were iden-

tified: studies centrally addressing both search strands ($n = 10$), studies primarily focusing on one strand while addressing the other only peripherally ($n = 18$), and studies not directly addressing either strand or published in an irrelevant country or language ($n = 40$). Full-text screening of the first two groups resulted in a final sample of 10 publications included in the scoping review (app. 3). The presentation of the topics refers to all sections of the texts.

5 Findings

The following section presents the answers provided by the literature to the main question underlying this review, which is: *What is known from the existing literature on far-right influences on migrant language provision?*

To structure the findings, we searched for themes, following a combination of inductive and deductive approaches. The literature reviewed has several focal points under which far-right influences are discussed. The chapter first shows how the purpose of language provision is being reinterpreted and redefined. It then demonstrates that integration policy is under growing pressure from the right and center parties adopting far-right positions, helping to normalize these shifts. The findings also show that the system of language provision is being changed structurally, not just rhetorically. Finally, the chapter indicates that pedagogical practices in language provision are affected by far-right pressure, although research on this remains limited.

5.1 The purpose of language provision is reinterpreted

The far-right shapes discourse and frames the purpose of language provision, with influence across multiple areas. Drawing on data from an ethnographic study in Spain, Reyes et. al show that a perceived lack of proficiency in the official language is, for instance, framed as a cause of social tensions, and used to justify stricter integration expectations, as a failure to integrate, and a potential security threat associated with radicalization and terrorism (Reyes et al., 2021, p. 69). Reyes et al. point out the strong connection, as evidenced by Khan (2016), between security and English language policy in the United Kingdom (ibid.). Further, a so-called *immigrant culture* is blamed for urban problems and transforms language into a symbol of cultural compliance or deviance (Schierup & Ålund, 2011, pp. 133–134). Against this backdrop, in the UK and Austria, poor language skills are defined as a social problem and discursively linked to crime (Duncan, 2010, p. 345; Simpson & Hunter, 2023, p. 165).

Right-wing populists thus construct the idea of *the people* through language (Reyes et al., 2021, p. 63). With her discourse analysis of the Finns Party's Immigration and Language Policy in the 2015 parliament election Criss shows that right-wing populist discourse of the Finns Party constructs *the people* primarily as the Finnish-speaking majority (Criss, 2020, p. 282). In the case of Finland, this means 'to let Finns or the Finnish language 'live' others must 'die'' (Criss, 2020, p. 285). Criss stresses: "To die" is not understood in its literal sense, but rather is used to refer to control and exclusion'

(ibid.). Right-wing populists consistently oppose multiculturalism and frame immigration as a cultural threat, as shown by a historical-comparative political analysis in Sweden (Schierup & Ålund, 2011, p. 136).

Milani et al., who did a discourse analysis and an ethnographic study in Sweden, report the ‘major shift from the official endorsement of multilingualism and multicultural dialogue to the active promotion of a monolingual and monocultural Swedish norm which migrants need to acquire for them to be granted the right to stay’ (2021, p. 768). So right-wing actors essentially promote a monolingualist, assimilationist ideology that seeks to control migrants through language (Akkerman, 2012, p. 523; Schierup & Ålund, 2011, p. 127; Simpson, 2019; Simpson & Hunter, 2023, p. 157). Assimilationist policies align with nativist, nationalist, and monocultural ideologies that prioritize the protection of a *native* or *dominant* culture over diversity.

By conducting a critical discourse analysis of government documents, reports, and strategies from Labour/Conservative governments (1979–2024) Flanagan shows that ESOL functions as a gatekeeping mechanism (2025, p. 2). Right-wing populists frame ESOL not primarily as a right or support, but as a means of assimilation and control: ‘While ESOL might promote integration, it may also reinforce marginalization when populist narratives depict migrants as risks and may frame ESOL primarily as a mechanism for assimilation instead of inclusion’ (Flanagan, 2025, p. 3).

Furthermore, Migrants are discursively constructed as a cost factor. According to Flanagan, a central element of right-wing populist argumentation is the reinterpretation of education spending: ‘Populist discourse portrays language provision as a fiscal liability instead of an investment in social unity, justifying policies restricting financing and accessibility’ (2025, p. 3). This populist rhetoric legitimizes access restrictions and cuts. Flanagan emphasizes that right-wing populist narratives are used to politically justify restrictive measures: ‘Populist policies may further limit ESOL by implementing budget cuts, imposing severe eligibility requirements, and prioritizing specific job market goals while neglecting wider educational objectives’ (Flanagan, 2025, p. 3). Schierup and Ålund (2011), as well as Flanagan (2025), show that right-wing populism merges with neoliberal goals. Crucially, right-wing populist actors reshape the normative foundations of integration policy by ‘challenging liberal and humanitarian visions and declaring national identity under threat from foreign cultures’ (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023, p. 155). In this way, language learning becomes embedded in narratives of cultural threat, conditional belonging, and national cohesion (Flanagan, 2025; Reyes et al., 2021; Schierup & Ålund, 2011).

5.2 Integration policy is under pressure from the far right

The politicization of language courses and language testing within integration policy is not a new phenomenon. By analyzing legislative changes made by 27 cabinets of varying political composition in the period between 1996 and 2010 of nine countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland), Akkerman has shown that language requirements have long been subject to pressure

from the political right (2012). At the same time, the extent to which far-right parties directly shape integration policies remains contested. Schierup & Ålund (2011) show that a more inclusive approach to integration was increasingly replaced by a right-wing and populist policy orientation after 2000. While language remained central to integration, Swedish proficiency was no longer primarily framed as a cultural or civic resource but rather as an economic requirement linked to productivity and labor market performance (Schierup & Ålund, 2011).

Based on a document analysis of 86 bills and laws on integration of the Austrian coalition government from 2017 to 2019 between the center-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the radical right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) Gruber and Rosenberger (2023) conceptualize the impact of right-wing populist actors as operating through 'influence in subtle and open ways' (p. 155), same as Criss (2020), Reyes et al. (2021) and Simpson and Hunter (2023). This influence manifests not only in concrete policy outputs but also through shifts in 'public opinion, media agenda and, most of all, in party competition' (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023, p. 155). Right-wing populism merges concerns over identity, security, terrorism, and immigration to legitimize exclusionary policies (Schierup & Ålund, 2011). Schierup & Ålund further argue that European liberalism has been overtaken by *illiberal liberalism*, blending neoliberalism with neo-conservative cultural nationalism (2011, pp. 137–138).

5.3 Center parties shift to the right

The effects of far-right influence on policies are particularly pronounced under conditions of party convergence. When mainstream parties adopt increasingly similar positions on migration and integration, right-wing populist actors gain greater capacity to shape the policy agenda (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023). The authors show that under these circumstances, right-wing populist actors not only translate their political demands into actual policy measures but also transform the overall style of policymaking toward a more populist logic. Changes in immigration and integration policies cannot be adequately understood without examining the interaction between far-right parties and center-right parties, both in government and opposition (Akkerman, 2012, p. 512). The electoral rise of far-right actors exerts pressure on mainstream parties to reconsider policy agendas that have been successfully politicized by these actors, particularly in the fields of migration and integration (Akkerman, 2012, p. 513; Duncan, 2010, p. 351; Simpson & Hunter, 2023). Several studies highlight that conservative parties increasingly adopt right-wing rhetoric and policy positions in response to this (Akkerman, 2012; Flanagan, 2025; Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023). Parties that have traditionally maintained more liberal and inclusive approaches to integration are 'pushed towards restrictive leanings by PRRPs' (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023, p. 157). Flanagan (2025) explicitly emphasizes that this effect transcends the electoral strength of populist parties: 'As populist parties acquire credibility, mainstream political parties encounter increasing temptation to implement restrictive immigration policies, frequently prompting even centrist or left-leaning administrations to bolster exclusionary ESOL frameworks' (2025, p. 3).

Empirical evidence from Austria clearly illustrates this process. Gruber and Rosenberger (2023) note that PRRP's claims are 'openly supported and co-opted by center-right partners' (p. 158). While the far right's direct influence on migration control has at times been limited, its impact on migrant integration policy has been more substantial, as shown by a document analysis of a 6-year period in the national government of the Austrian Freedom Party and Alliance for Austria's Future (2000–2006) (Duncan, 2010, p. 347). Beyond formal policy change, the normalization of far-right discourse within the political mainstream further reinforces these developments. As Milani et al. (2021, p. 762) argue, 'the political mainstream has moved closer to the positions of the extreme right, and there has been a normalization of far-right discourse'. Vocabulary that was once associated with right-wing nationalism – such as references to 'our Swedish values' or 'our way of life' – has become commonplace across the political spectrum, with 'all parties' now employing such language (Milani et al., 2021, p. 762).

5.4 The system of language provision is being changed

Several consequences of far-right influence on integration and language policy can be identified, particularly when such actors participate in government. In Austria, the coalition between right-wing populist and centrist parties enabled significant policy shifts. This involves strengthening regulatory tools (prohibitions, surveillance, delayed services, and segregation), weakening distributive measures through cuts or conditionality, and centralizing policy implementation at the expense of civil society (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023, p. 168). As a result, PRRPs not only accelerate the pace of policy action but also pursue a confrontational mode of governance (ibid.). A recurring pattern across national contexts is the centralization of integration and language policy combined with the systematic exclusion of non-governmental actors. As Gruber observes, 'the right-wing coalition departed from a rather pluralist approach of integration governance in the past towards centralized responsibilities, crowding out non-governmental actors viewed as being opposed to the government positions' (ibid., p. 164). This is an important finding regarding the field of diversity, human rights education, integration, and language provision.

One of the key areas of right-wing populist influence is the legalization of language acquisition. Attendance at language classes increasingly becomes a sanctioning instrument tied to residence status. In Austria, 'the Schüssel cabinets began for the first time to frame integration in terms of legal obligations' (Duncan, 2010, p. 345), putting sanctions on those not complying. Mandatory language courses for all migrants who had entered the country after 1997 were introduced (ibid.). There, language skills have been used to condition access to social assistance payments (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023, p. 163). As Duncan emphasizes, failure to comply can have severe consequences: 'For those not complying, a series of sanctions were proposed, ultimately leading up to the loss of residence permit' (2010, p. 345). Crucially, core elements of the Austrian populist policy agenda – such as these mandatory language courses – remained in place even after the FPÖ's³ exit from government (ibid., p. 346). This persis-

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tence suggests that right-wing populist approaches to language and integration policies have become institutionally normalized. In addition to compulsory participation, the shifting of costs onto migrants themselves is identified as a right-wing populist policy tool: In Austria '[t]he 2005 revision of the Foreigners Act increased the length of the course and by reducing the state's share of the cost, increased the fee for the individual migrant' (Duncan, 2010, p. 345). In light of this, language courses and civic orientation classes are being made politically mandatory to obtain citizenship (Milani et al., 2021, p. 762). On the one hand, democratic values and human rights are expected to be shared by all inhabitants of a democracy; on the other hand, religious and traditional value systems are discredited by the proposition that there is a single, homogeneous culture within each nation.

Access to language provision is thus increasingly linked to migration status and compliance with integration requirements. Flanagan shows this growing conditionality in ESOL provision (2025, p. 3). As mentioned before, language learning is no longer framed primarily as a social right but as an obligation subject to monitoring and sanctioning. Milani et al. (2021) analyze this dynamic as a broader disciplinary process in which migrants are shaped into normative citizens and are encouraged to abandon perceived negative habits from their home countries and adopt Swedish norms (p. 768). This logic is also reproduced in urban policy debates. Schierup & Ålund note that suggested interventions for migrant-dense suburbs include 'better training in the Swedish language' alongside policing, workfare, and surveillance (2011, p. 134).

Despite these restrictive developments, significant constraints still come from supranational bodies such as the European Commission and from national and international high courts. This highlights the importance of democratic separation of powers and strong institutional veto points as key safeguards for protecting immigrant minorities at the national level (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023, p. 169). In addition to judicial and supranational checks, activism has played an important role in resisting further cutbacks to ESOL provision in the UK (Simpson & Hunter, 2023, p. 165).

5.5 Far-right pressure on pedagogical practices in language provision

Following the presentation of the findings regarding the changes to the system of language provision, findings show there is not a lot of research on what far-right influence looks like at the level of institutions of adult education. In the field of ESOL, Simpson and Hunter (2023) demonstrate with their document analysis and their interviews with a range of stakeholders that such governance shifts lead to enduring structural problems: 'Analysis of current policy and of interviews with key ESOL stakeholders suggests an enduring condition of fragmentation and lack of coordination to the detriment of students' (p. 155). There are only indirect hints about teachers and learners in these studies, but across countries, we can assume that teachers often have migration histories themselves (Milani et al., 2021) and learners are highly diverse by country of origin, legal status, as well as literacy and language skills (Vertovec, 2024). By investigating linguistic and cultural transformations in superdiverse wards in four UK cities, Simpson analyzed the communication challenges faced by immigrants in the area of immi-

gration law and the impact of a hostile political environment on language learning with a linguistic ethnography. Societal developments toward right-wing populism make linguistic integration more difficult, leading to the demand that language courses should prepare immigrants for the hostile environment (Simpson, 2019). Milani et al. points to tensions produced in classroom settings by the us–them dichotomy (2021, p. 769). Practitioners often face conflicting messages: on one hand, they are asked to recognize linguistic diversity; on the other hand, they face the traditional and still common idea of ‘one language, one territory’ (Reyes et al., 2021, p. 69). For practitioners and providers in adult migrant language education, Simpson and Hunter call for ‘a supportive policy structure so that they in turn can support the students and potential students for whom they have responsibility’ (2023, p. 158).

6 Discussion and conclusion

The findings show how the far-right changes policies and discourse around language provision. While migration remains a central political issue for the right, their influence is exercised through the restructuring of integration policy, with language provision becoming a key site of intervention. Language learning is reframed from a social right into a monitored obligation, enforced through sanctions such as the loss of residence status and the shifting of costs onto migrants. Embedded in narratives of cultural threat and national unity, these policies reflect a nativist ideology that promotes monolingualism and assimilation as a core principle of right-wing populist politics, reinforced by neoliberal logics. The reviewed literature confirms that far-right positions are adopted by mainstream parties and implemented into more restrictive integration policies. Post-populist governments keep the aggravated integration policies. The literature about far-right pressure on language teachers and learners is thin, and further research is necessary.

These findings suggest a shift in the *Overton Window*, characterized by the growing normalization of positions and policy preferences that were previously deemed unacceptable. The question arises whether non-populist, populist, and post-populist political contexts share common features. In non-populist governments, integration policies and discourse are influenced through pressure on center parties. In populist governments or coalitions with populists, integration policies tend to be directly restricted. In post-populist phases, such restrictions often persist, even when they no longer align with the official positions of governing parties. The existing body of literature is too limited to draw definitive conclusions, but the issue deserves further attention.

We can conclude from a meta-perspective that there is very little research on the relationship between the far right and language provision. There is also very little research from German-speaking countries. In terms of content, there is hardly any discussion of far-right pressure on language provision at the meso and micro levels. If a thematic focus can be identified, it lies at the macro level and is therefore mainly situated within political science and policy research. Coming back to our background, it is

striking how little research there is from the perspective of adult education. As mentioned in the reasoning of the research questions for the review, there are scholars in adult education dealing with language provision from diverse critical perspectives. One could argue that far-right influences can be studied or reported on without calling these influences in this particular way. Our review is dependent on other scholars linking developments in language provision to far-right pressure. But focusing on far-right influence enables an analysis of specific strategies and counterstrategies. Conceptualizing pressure on language provision as far-right influence is analytically justified insofar as this pressure is articulated, legitimized, and institutionalized through actors and discourses associated with far-right politics. This approach does not exclude other critical explanations, but focuses on a specific dimension of influence on language provision. However, the few empirical studies that link language provision and the far-right, along with the varying ways in which the concept of the far right is used, present analytical challenges.

The findings of this review point to significant gaps in existing literature, particularly concerning the empirical investigation of how right-wing populist and far-right pressure translates into concrete practices within the field of language provision and how these processes intersect with beliefs about migration and integration in the field. There is limited research examining how these dynamics are experienced and what counterstrategies work and are being developed at the level of institutions and adult educators. These limitations highlight the need for a new empirical study, which is currently underway.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: Searchstrings

Term 1 AND	Term 2
Language provision OR	Right-wing OR
Language training OR	Far-right OR
Language and literacy programmes OR	Populis* OR
Language support OR	Radical right OR
Linguistic integration OR	
Language education OR	
Language course OR	
Language assessment OR	
Second language instruction	
Integration courses OR	Right-wing OR
Language policy OR	Far-right OR
Civic orientation course OR	Populis* OR
Integration course OR	Radical right OR
Integration programm OR	
Integration policy OR	
Orientation programs OR	
Begriff 1 AND	Begriff 2
Integrationskurs OR	Rechtspopulis* OR
Deutschkurs OR	Rechtsextrem* OR
Sprachkurs OR	Rechte Parteien OR
	Neue Rechte OR
	Rechtsextrem OR

Appendix 2: Inclusion and Exclusion criteria

Inclusion criteria	Exclusion criteria
• The subject area of adult education is addressed, which refers to language provision, formal areas of adult education • The terms of content, the focus is on language provision • The text is published in English or German • Up to the point of full text analysis, collective works will be included as soon as one of the contributions meets the above criteria • Topic is addressed in the main/full text, not just in the appendix • Based on empirical research	• Other areas of education (such as school, vocational training, higher education) are addressed. • The text is published in a language other than English or German • Collections in which none of the entries meet the above criteria • Country other than the EU and the UK

Appendix 3: References included in the Review

Title	Year	Country	Method	Data
Akerman, Tjitske: Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government: Immigration and Integration Policies in Nine Countries (1996–2010).	2012	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland	comparative analysis of immigration and integration legislation	legislative changes made by 27 cabinets of varying political composition in the period between 1996 and 2010 in nine countries
Criss, Marika K.: language, immigration, and identity An analysis of the discourses of the Finns Party.	2020	Finland	discourse analysis	the Finns Party official releases on immigration and language in the 2015 parliamentary election.
Flanagan, Declan: Neoliberal Governments, ESOL Provision and Wider Implications.	2025	UK	a critical discourse analysis	government documents, reports, and strategies from Labour/ Conservative governments (1979–2024)
Duncan, Fraser: Immigration and integration policy and the Austrian radical right in office: the FPÖ/BZÖ, 2000–2006.	2010	Austria	literature review, document analysis,	6-year period in the national government of the Austrian Freedom Party and Alliance for Austria's Future (2000–2006)
Gruber, Oliver: Rosenberger, Sieglinde: Between opportunities and constraints: right-wing populists as designers of migrant integration policy.	2023	Austria	document analysis	86 bills and laws on integration of the Austrian coalition government from 2017 to 2019 between the center-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the radical right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)
Milani, Tommaso; Bauer, Simon; Carlson, Marie; Spehar, Andrea; Brömssen, Kerstin von: Citizenship as status, habitus and acts: Language requirements and civic orientation in Sweden.	2021	Sweden	discourse analysis and ethnographic insights	policy and media debates and ethnography in educational provision of samhällsorientering
Reyes, Charo; Carrasco Pons, Sílvia; Narciso Pedro, Laia: Language and Social Integration in Times of Increasing Anti-Immigration Discourses.	2021	Spain, Germany, Italy, and Poland	ethnographic study, focus groups, participant observation, and questionnaires	an ethnographic four-year project focused on mobility and language, and data obtained during a training and exchange three-year process with adult education teachers in the Erasmus+ ORALPHA project

Title	Year	Country	Method	Data
Schierup, Carl-Ulrik; Alund, Aleksandra: From Paradoxes of Multiculturalism to Paradoxes of Liberalism: Sweden and the European Neo-Liberal Hegemony.	2011	Sweden	historical-comparative political and discourse analysis	the paper does not provide a detailed explanation of the underlying data
Simpson, James: Navigating Immigration Law in a "Hostile Environment": Implications for Adult Migrant Language Education.	2019	UK	linguistic ethnography	interviews and recordings of interactions.
Simpson, James; Hunter, Ann-Marie: Policy formation for adult migrant language education in England: national neglect and its implications.	2023	UK	document analysis and interviews	with a range of stakeholders

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